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11 Introduction
There is now a substantial body of literature that argues that the principal
cause of child labor is poverty. This is not to deny that there can be other
causes as well. The availability of good schools, and simple incentives, like a
meal for children at school or a subsidy to parents who send their children to
school, can make a diﬀerence to child labor. But the fact remains, this liter-
ature would argue, that the primary cause of child labor is poverty. Barring
rare cases of abusive parents, parents do not like to send their children to
work if they can aﬀord not to. This has been called the ‘luxury axiom’ in this
literature and there is a lot of evidence that supports this view (for discussion
see Basu and Van, 1998; Basu 1999; Ray, 2000; Basu and Tzanntos, 2003;
Emerson and Souza, 2003; Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005; Edmonds, 2005).
However, some recent evidence has cast doubt on this view of child labor.
Bhalotra and Heady (2003) have shown that in some developing countries -
Peru and Pakistan in their study - the amount that the children of a house-
hold works increases with the amount of land possessed by the household
(see also Menon, 2005). Since land is usually strongly correlated with a
household’s income, this ﬁnding seems to challenge the hypothesis that child
labor is caused by poverty.
Given the growing global concern about and the urgent need to end child
labor, it is important for us to get the details of the causes of child labor
right. Hence, the above dispute deserves serious scrutiny.
The view that we take in this paper is that the challenge to the luxury
axiom does not stand up to closer examination. We argue that in developing
countries labor markets are usually quite imperfect. This means that there
may be poor households that want to send their children to work (in order to
escape extreme poverty) but are unable to do so simply because they have no
access to labor markets close to their home. If in this situation the household
comes to acquire some wealth, say land, its children will get to work more
because they can now do what they earlier wished to do. Hence, we argue
that this seemingly perverse response to greater wealth is a consequence
of the luxury axiom in conjunction with labor market imperfection. This
possibility is also suggested by the evidence discussed by Edmonds and Turk
(2004) that in Vietnam households that have their own businesses are more
likely to have their children do labor.
But this in turn has another interesting implication. If the household’s
land-ownership continues to rise then surely beyond a point the household
1will be so well-oﬀ that it will not want to make its children work, even
though it has all the land to work with. This intuitive claim is theoretically
established in the paper and it means that we have a clear empirically-testable
proposition: As a household’s land ownership rises, child labor will ﬁrst rise
and then decline, in the manner of an inverted-U.
The underlying theoretical model is described in section 2. Then in
section 3 we use a unique data set from Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal
states of India that has information on the hours of work done by children,
unlike data sets from most countries including the nationally representative
Indian datasets such as those of the National Sample Survey and the National
Family Health Survey. The detailed data on hours worked in various activities
has two major advantages relative to the existing literature on child labor.
First, the detailed activity information we have allows us to include domestic
work done by children in their own homes as child labor, which we ﬁnd to
be the largest component. Second, since our measure of child labor is not a
censored or binary variable we can estimate the eﬀects of various factors on
child labor by regression. In this case reliable estimates of the eﬀects only
require the error term of the regression equation to be uncorrelated with the
regressors whereas censored or binary data require maximum liklihood or
semiparametric/nonparametric approaches that assume the knowledge of the
form of the error distribution (e.g. normal or logistic) or assume independent
and identical distribution of the error term conditional on the regressors.
In our case, good quality data allows us to use simpler and more robust
estimation approaches. We test the inverted-U hypothesis and ﬁnd strong
empirical corroboration for land.
2 The Theory
2.1 Basic Structure
Let us consider an economy in which households treat non-work on the part
of children to be a luxury good. That is, they would not think of indulging
in this if the household’s income happened to be very low. This is the
so-called ‘luxury axiom’. Now suppose that this household has k units of
wealth - let us assume land. It will be shown that if the economy has a
perfectly functioning labor market, then, as k rises, child labor has to fall.
But once we allow labor markets to be imperfect, as k rises, child labor can
2rise. However, under some plausible conditions, child labor will eventually
begin to fall as k continues to rise.
To model this as simply as possible let us assume each household is en-
dowed with the utility function
u = u(x,e) (1)
where x is the total consumption of the household and e[0,1] is the amount
of work the children of the household do. We will assume that each household
has 1 adult and the adult ﬁnds labor costless or, equivalently, leisure of no
worth and so always prefers to work.
To keep the subsequent algebra simple let us build the luxury axiom into
(1) Gby taking it to be quasi-linear as follows:
u = φ(x) − c · e (2)
where φ(x) ≥ 0 and φ00(x) ≤ 0, for all x, and both these inequalities are
strict up to some X > 0. And c is a positive real number.
It is easy to verify that if this household’s income doubles, child leisure or
non-work, 1 − e, will more than double, thereby showing that it is a luxury
good.
2.2 The Perfect Labor Market Case
Perfect labor market means that each household faces a market wage, w,
and it can buy or sell as much labor as it wishes. We are assuming that
adults and children earn the same wage. Introducing an adult equivalence
correction, as is standard in this literature, does not really make a diﬀerence
here, and is therefore ignored.
Given that the household owns k units of land and there is a perfect labor
market, it can earn a proﬁt of π(k,w) from this land. Of course πk(k,w) > 0.
If this household supplies e units of child labor to the labor market we have
x = π(k,w) + w + ew. (3)
Recall that the household has 1 adult who always works.
From (2) and (3) we can write the household’s problem to be:
max
e φ(π(k,w) + w + ew) − ce.
3This gives us the ﬁrst-order condition
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Hence, since πk > 0, as k rises, child labor has to fall.
If we are to understand the Bhalotra and Heady (2003) empirical ﬁnding,
clearly the perfect labor market assumption has to go. This is what we
proceed to do in the next section and derive further implications of such a
model before subjecting it to empirical test.
2.3 The No Labor Market Case
For reasons of simplicity we shall deal with the polar case of labor market
imperfection - an economy where each household has to fend entirely for
itself.
We therefore need to be a bit more explicit about where the proﬁt, π,
came from in Section 2.2. Suppose each household has a production function,
f, such that
q = f(k, e + 1) (4)
where q is output produced, k is land owned and e+1 is the amount of labor
used - e from the children and 1 from the adult. We make usual assumptions
on f, namely, fk, fe > 0; fkk, fee ≤ 0; and fek > 0.
Since there is no labor market in this economy, the household consumes
what it produces. Hence x = q.
Therefore, the household’s optimization problem using (2) and (4) is as
follows:
max
e φ(f(k, e + 1)) − ce. (5)
Hence, we have the ﬁrst-order condition:
φx · fe = c. (6)









4It is easy to verify that the denominator is always negative. Hence, the sign
of de
dk is the sign of [fefkφxx + fekφx]. Since this can have diﬀerent signs, all
we know now is that with imperfect labor market, a rise in the household’s
wealth can lead to a rise or fall in child labor.
In fact, equations 6 and 7 enable us to say a little bit more. From equation
6, we know that, given a level of k, say k0, the household chooses e so that
φx = c
fe. Let the optimum be e0. Now suppose the household’s wealth
increases. Since fk > 0, the increase in wealth results in an increase in
output (and hence x) if e = e0. The increased level of x lowers φx, the extent
of the reduction depending upon the degree of concavity of φ. However, since
fek > 0, the higher level of k also increases fe, and so lowers c
fe. Of course,
the extent of the increase in fe depends upon the value of fek.
Hence, the eﬀect of an increase in household wealth on child labor depends
both upon the speciﬁcation of the utility function and production function.
In particular, an increase in household wealth is likely to increase (decrease)
child labor if
(i) fek is “large” (“small”),
(ii) fe and fk are “small”(“large”),
(iii) φx is “large” (“small”),
(iv) the absolute value of φxx is “small” (“large”).





2x2, if x < A
Z
A2
2Z, if x ≥ A
Z
(8)
Figure 1 plots φ(x) as a function of x. Next assume that the production
function takes the following Cobb-Douglas form,
f(k, 1 + e) = mk(e + 1) (9)




Amk(e + 1) − Z
2[mk(e + 1)]2 − ce, ∀e + 1 < A
Zmk
A2
2Z − ce, , ∀e + 1 ≥ A
Zmk
(10)
Since the household incurs a positive disutility of c > 0 from sending a child
to work, the household will never choose a level of e if this results in φx = 0.
That is, the optimum level of e will be such that φ(x) < Ax − Z
2x2. We
record this observation as Lemma 1.
5Lemma 1 The value of e that optimizes (10) is always such that e + 1 <
A/Zmk.
In the light of Lemma 1, we can solve the household’s problem by using
the ﬁrst line of (9) to represent u and deriving the ﬁrst-order condition.
Amk − Zm
2k
2(e + 1) = c
or,







From (10) it is obvious that as k rises e will ﬁrst rise and then fall. The
turning point occurs where k = 2C/Am. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
The aim in the next section is to investigate the relation between e and
k and see if it is indeed an inverted-U, in reality.
3 Empirical Test
3.1 Nature of the Data
Most empirical analyses of child labor use data sets that do not have any
information on hours worked - the typical information is essentially binary
since the data only records whether a child works or not. Most studies on
child labor treat school and work as mutually exclusive activities. We are
fortunate to have a rich dataset which has detailed information on the amount
of time spent by children in various activities. It covers 3505 children–1759
boys and 1746 girls – between the ages of 6 and 14 years in 1490 households in
the rural areas of Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal. These children belong
to villages in the mid-Himalayan region with an altitude of 1800-3000 metres
and with an average distance to a jeepable road of 3.8 kilometers. Inspite of
the remoteness, 92 percent of children between the ages of 6 to 14 years go
to school and 93 percent of children between the ages of 10 to 14 years go to
school, which is not less than the national average.
In contrast to the usual deﬁnition of “child labor” in most child labor
statistics, our deﬁnition of child labor will include domestic work that con-
sists of chores done inside the house as well as work done for the household but
outside the home such as livestock grazing, collection of goods for household
6use, e.g., ﬁrewood, fodder and other forest products. Table 1 shows the dis-
tribution of daily hours worked in various activities. “Domestic work”refers
to the ﬁrst two rows of Table 1. In this Table a child is described as “work-
ing” if he/she is engaged in any of the four activities listed in the ﬁrst four
rows of Table 1. It shows that 96.8 percent of all children are involved in
positive amounts of child labor. Due to this low level of censoring in our
data we are able to use estimators that rely on weakest assumptions, such as
regression, as compared to those required by discrete or censored data.
Table 1 - Daily Hours Worked
Activity No. Hrs Male Female
No. Hrs No. Hrs
Age Group - 6 to 14 Years
Domestic Chores 3386 1.5 1693 1.4 1693 1.64
Domestic Labour (outside the hh) 2255 1.5 1095 1.3 1160 1.63
Unpaid family business 1649 0.8 792 0.8 857 0.83
Work for wage 4 0 3 0 1 5E-04
Working 3394 3.9 1700 3.6 1694 4.23
Number of Children 3505 3.8 1759 3.5 1746 4.11
Age Group - 10 to 14 Years
Domestic Chores 2088 1.6 1059 1.4 1029 1.79
Domestic Labour (outside the hh) 1585 1.9 774 1.7 811 2.14
Unpaid family business 1236 1 604 1 632 1.06
Work for wage 4 0 3 0 1 9E-04
Working 2092 4.6 1062 4.2 1030 5.1
Number of Children 2137 4.6 1085 4.1 1052 4.99
Clearly, domestic work is by far the most signiﬁcant category in all the
age as well as gender categories. Hence the usual exclusion of domestic work
as part of child labor grossly under estimates its extent. Table 1 also shows
that older children and girls tend to work more. For girls of all ages and
boys above 10 years of age the daily average hours of work is more than four
hours a day!
7Table 2 - Participation Rate Based on Cutoﬀ
All Girls 10 to 14 years Girls
10 to 14 years
No. % No. % No. % No. %
parti- parti- parti- parti-
cipation cipation cipation cipation
rate rate rate rate
Hours worked 3394 96.83 1694 97.02 2092 97.89 1030 58.99
greater than 0
Hours worked 2914 83.14 1485 85.05 1933 90.45 971 92.30
greater than 1
Hours worked 2221 63.37 1174 67.24 1673 78.29 868 82.51
greater than 2
Hours worked 1678 47.87 910 52.12 1348 63.08 729 69.30
greater than 3
Hours worked 1173 33.47 680 38.95 992 46.42 578 54.94
greater than 4
Hours worked 822 23.45 502 28.75 697 32.62 431 40.97
greater than 5
Excluding Domestic Work
Hours worked 1649 47.05 857 49.08 1236 57.84 632 36.19
greater than 0
Hours worked 778 22.20 394 22.57 625 29.25 315 29.94
greater than 1
Hours worked 327 9.33 160 9.16 277 12.96 135 12.83
greater than 2
Hours worked 98 2.80 38 2.18 94 4.40 37 3.52
greater than 3
Hours worked 12 0.34 5 0.29 10 0.47 4 0.38
greater than 4
Hours worked 6 0.17 3 0.17 4 0.19 2 0.19
greater than 5
Table 2 provides detailed evidence on participation rates of child labor
based on various cut-oﬀs. The table shows that the participation rate is very
sensitive to the cutoﬀs and falls substantially if the cutoﬀ rises even by an
hour. It is also apparent from the table that the incidence of child labor falls
dramatically if domestic work is excluded from the deﬁnition of child labor.
Table 3 provides a rough idea of the relationship between the incidence of
child labor and household land ownership. Here, land is measured in bighas,
where 5 bighas is equal to an acre. The table shows that the average hours
worked increases with land and goes down after the third quartile for all age
8groups indicating a possible inverted-U relationship.1
Table 3 - Land and Child Labor (Land in Bighas)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
(0-1.35) (1.36-3.9) (4-6.95 ) (6.96-47.3)
All Total number 785 872 874 974
6 to 14 years Number worked 731 857 859 947
Hours worked 2.49 4.24 4.46 4.22
10 to 14 Years Total number 477 539 529 592
Number worked 454 535 523 580
Hours worked 2.88 4.95 5.35 5.11
Girls Total number 375 434 449 488
6 to 14 years Number worked 346 429 444 475
Hours worked 2.71 4.57 4.88 4.43
Girls 10 to 14 Years Total number 227 267 271 287
Number worked 214 266 269 281
Hours worked 3.17 5.46 5.97 5.4
In a multivariate setting, which controls for other variables that poten-
tially aﬀect child labor, the univariate relationships between asset holding
and incidence of child labor can change. Hence, we now turn to the variables
that potentially have an eﬀect on child labor. Age and gender are two child
characteristics that may be important. With regard to household character-
istics, we consider household age and gender composition, assets and adult
education. Many empirical studies of child labor use consumption expendi-
ture as a measure of living standards to assess the magnitude of impact of
poverty on child labor. This measure is potentially subject to endogeneity
bias as a child’s income is also a determinant of current consumption. In-
stead, assets are likely to be more exogenous and free from such bias. For
instance, in our data, land holdings of a household are generally inherited
and hence largely exogenous. The other asset that is important in our data
is livestock. We measure livestock as an aggregate of the large ones (cows,
buﬀaloes and mules) and the small ones (goats and sheep), where the small
ones are given a weight of 0.5. The summary statistics of all these variables
are given in Table 4.
1However, this pattern is not true for livestock, the other principal asset in these areas.
9Table 4 - Description of Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hours worked 3505 3.792 2.457 0 15
School and studying hours 3505 5.437 1.634 0 8
Land (in bighas) 3505 5.069 5.033 0 47.3
Age (in years) 3505 10.195 2.444 6 14
Female dummy 3505 0.498 0.5001 0 1
Number of children 3505 3.551 1.416 1 12
Number of adult males 3505 1.378 0.844 0 11
Number of adult females 3505 1.53 0.836 0 6
Schooling of adult males 3505 6.703 4.049 0 17
(in years)
Schooling of adult females 3505 3.661 3.461 0 16
(in years)
Livestock 3505 6.235 11.922 0 215
In the table above, mean land (mean livestock) computation is for all
children including those for children from landless (no livestock) homes. Of
the 3505 children, 2919 belong to households with positive land holdings
with a minimum of 0.2 and a mean of 6.09. Similarly, 2866 children belong
to households with mean positive livestock holdings of 7.62 and a minimum
of 0.5 (a goat or a sheep only - which is assumed to be half of a big livestock
such as a cow).
3.2 Estimable Equation
Let the dependent variable yihv be the daily hours worked by the ith child
in the hth household in the vth village. The vector of characteristics of the
ith child is denoted by Xi while that of a household is denoted by Xh. The
former represents the supply characteristics of child labor while the latter
represents the demand characteristics of child labor. There are also likely to
be village characteristics that aﬀect both the supply as well as the demand
for child labor. It is important to allow for them to obtain reliable estimates
of the eﬀects of Xi and Xh. We denote all the relevant (unobserved) village
characteristics by αv. The estimable equation can now be written as:
yihv = αv + Xiβi + Xhβh +  (12)
We estimate two variants of the above equation separately for the four
diﬀerent groups of children when the deﬁnition of work includes domestic
10work. In the ﬁrst variant we estimate the equation as being nonlinear only in
land, the commonly used wealth measure for rural areas. The second variant
is the more general model that is nonlinear both in land as well as livestock.
Tables 5-9 report the results. Our focus here is to obtain reliable estimates
of the eﬀects of the characteristics of children and households on child labor
while recognizing that village characteristics may also have an aﬀect on it
and may be correlated with household characteristics. Hence we use village
ﬁxed -eﬀects regression for all our analysis. The standard errors are robust
and account for correlation within clusters.
Table 5 - Village Fixed-Eﬀects Regression: Non-Linear in Land Only
Variable All Girls 10 to 14 years Girls
10 to 14 years
Age .379*** .564*** .335*** .549***
(0.0194) (0.0.021) (0.045) (0.049)
Female dummy -1.161*** 0 -1.658** 0
(0.289) (0.779)
Age * female .179*** 0 .22*** 0
(0.027) (0.065)
Land .136*** .133*** .206*** .199***
(0.017) (0.025) (0.026) (0.042)
Land square -.004*** -.004*** -.007*** -.007***
(0.0006) (0.001) (.001) (0.002)
Number of children -0.046 -0.022 -0.033 -0.009
(0.028) (0.041) (0.039) (0.057)
Number of adult males -.101* -0.074 -0.097 0.008
(0.053) (0.079) (0.074) (0.109)
Number of adult females -.125** -.152* -.214*** -.254**
(0.051) (0.081) (0.071) (0.113)
Schooling of adult males -.058*** -.084*** -.071*** -.107***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.024)
Schooling of adult females -.112*** -.127*** -.134*** -.148***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.029)
Livestock 0.005 0.005 .009* 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Constant 0.374 -.719** 0.916 -0.509
(0.247) (0.302) (0.578) (0.665)
No. of observation 3505 1746 2137 1052
r2 within 0.334 0.362 0.241 0.236
In Table 5, we observe that child labor increases with age, the eﬀect being
particularly pronounced for girls. The statistically signiﬁcant (at 1 percent)
11negative sign of female dummy suggests the absence of an unconditional
female bias. The bias depends on their age. Older girls are made to work
more (probably for sibling care). The presence of female adults in a household
helps reduce child labor more than the presence of male adults or other
children. Similarly educating females is more eﬀective in reducing child labor
than educating males. More interestingly, the regression exercise suggests
strongly that there is indeed an inverted-U relationship with land for all
groups of children. As table 6 show, on average, the turning point occurs at
16.85 bighas or 3.7 acres of land per household.
Table 6 - Turning Point and Marginal Eﬀect of Land
Variable All Girls 10 to 14 years Girls 10 to 14 yrs
Turning Point of land 16.854 17.053 14.582 14.409
Derivative of land (at mean land holding) 0.095 0.094 0.135 0.129
From Table 6, the derivative with respect to land, at mean land holding,
implies that child labor increases by approximately 0.1 hours per day for
every bigha of land or about 1/2 hour per day for every acre of land. The
derivative or the marginal eﬀect of land on child labor increases with age but
the turning point after which the marginal eﬀect becomes negative moves to
the left with age. The turning point in each case is far below the maximum
but well above the mean. The mean and the standard deviation of land
holdings imply that for most households the marginal impact of an increase
in land holding on child labor is positive. This indicates the importance of
the possible labor market imperfections.
As far as household composition is concerned, the number of adult fe-
males in a household make the most diﬀerence. Each additional adult female
reduces the hours worked by a child by 0.12 hours for all children. This eﬀect
is more pronounced for girls and older children. Similarly, the education of
the adult females in the households helps reduce the incidence of child labor
by double the magnitude of reduction due to the education of its adult males.
Livestock turns out to be an unimportant explanatory variable in the
linear speciﬁcation though in the older age group of all children it has a
marginally signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. In order to check whether a non-linear,
speciﬁcation tells a diﬀerent story, we now specify the estimated equation to
be nonlinear in livestock.
12Table 7 - Village Fixed Eﬀects Regression : Non-Linear in Land and Livestock
Variable All Girls 10 to 14 years Girls 10 to 14 years
Age .379*** .563*** .336*** .546***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.047) (0.054)
Female dummy -1.157*** 0 -1.61* 0
(0.253) (0.89)
Age * female .178*** 0 .217*** 0
(0.027) (0.074)
Land .125*** .125*** .189*** .188***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.043) (0.066)
Land square -.0034*** -.0032** -.006*** -.006*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
No. children -.051 -0.025 -0.039 -0.016
(0.037) (0.053) (0.043) (0.065)
No. adult male -0.076 -0.046 -0.089 0.014
(0.075) (0.091) (0.086) (0.101)
No. adult female -0.134* -0.154 -0.230*** -0.261**
(0.069) (0.1003) (0.082) (0.119)
Average edu adult male -.059*** -.086*** -.072*** -.108***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
Average edu adult female -.108*** -.124*** -.131*** -.147***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.033)
Livestock .019** .016* .021** 0.011
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Livestock square -.000048 -6.00e-06 -.00018 -0.00008
(0.0001) (0.00013) (0.00015) (0.00019)
Livestock * Land -0.00049 -0.0008 0.0007 0.00013
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.0012)
Constant 0.339 -.757** 0.917 -0.467
(0.301) (0.361) (0.665) (0.706)
No. of observation 3505 1746 2137 1052
r2 within 0.335 0.363 0.242 0.237
Table 8 - Turning Point and Marginal Eﬀects of Land ( at mean values)
Variable All Girls 10 to 14 years Girls 10 to 14 years
Turning Point of land 18.01 18.57 14.87 14.68
Derivative of land 0.087 0.087 0.127 0.123
From tables 7 and 8, we ﬁnd that the relationship of land and child labor
is similar to that in tables 5 and 6, i.e. an inverted-U. However, in Table 7,
we do not see strong evidence of livestock having an inverted-U relationship
with child labor as indicated by the insigniﬁcance of the quadratic term. The
13negative sign of the quadratic term suggests a downward turning point and
statistically signiﬁcant value of the linear term implies the increase in child
labor as livestock increases. The results with respect to the other variables
are similar to those in Table 5.2 The fact that land gives a more deﬁnite
inverted-U relation than other assets may at ﬁrst sight seem surprising, since
they all constitute wealth. However, as the theoretical model makes clear,
assets that have diﬀerent employment potentials will have diﬀerent eﬀects
on child labor. Land was of particular interest to us here because it is such
a critical complement of labor in the rural areas of developing countries and
also because much of the prior work on child labor and wealth, focussed on
land.
There can be other assets which certainly count as wealth but do not have
same capacity to employ labor and so may not have the relationship with
child labor as predicted by our model. Take, for instance, jewellery. We would
expect a rise in a household’s jewellery to have a declining eﬀect on child
labor throughout, since more jewellery means less poverty without the added
complication of greater capacity to employ labor. The same would apply for
education of adults since that enhances human capital and therefore wealth
without improving the employment prospects of children. Not surprisingly,
we do ﬁnd that higher education leads to lower child labor for all levels of
adult education.
In the estimations reported in tables 5 and 7, all the household variables
have been assumed to be exogenous. Baland and Robinson (2000) raise the
issue of endogeneity of the number of children as households may decide
to have more children motivated by the return from child labor. If this is
true then our estimates may be biased. One way to check whether they are
indeed biased is to estimate the eﬀects of a child’s characteristics on his/her
labor using household ﬁxed-eﬀects and compare them to those in Table 5
and Table 7. In this set-up we do not have any household variable except a
household dummy so that we avoid the problem of potential endogeneity of
all the household variables. 3 These results are reported in Table 11.
2We also estimated the general speciﬁcation, which allowed for non-linearity in all
assets including education and labor stock (household composition). But we did not ﬁnd
evidence of such eﬀects and hence base our results on the parsimonious speciﬁcation in
table 7.
3We are grateful to Jean Marie Baland for suggesting this approach.
14Table 9 - Robustness Check: Household Fixed Eﬀects Regression
Variable All Girls 10 to 14 years Girls 10 to 14 years
Age .446*** .627*** .391*** .661***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.045) (0.066)
Female dummy -.966*** 0 -1.985** 0
(0.266) (0.853)
Age female .161*** 0 .248*** 0
(0.026) (0.072)
Constant -1.095*** -2.278*** -0.554 -2.835***
(0.195) (0.276) (0.545) (0.783)
No. of observation 3505 1746 2137 1052
r2 within 0.496 0.516 0.353 0.331
Comparing these estimates with those in Table 7, we see that the patterns
are the same and the values diﬀer marginally as compared to the mean hours
worked of 3.9 hours per day. This conﬁrms our conﬁdence in the estimates
reported in the earlier table.
Our results have an interesting policy implication. The channel through
which poverty is reduced is important. If monetary transfers are given to
every poor households to reduce poverty, and these transfers are in turn used
to increase their levels of agrarian assets such as land or livestock, child labor
may in fact increase. On the other hand, policies which improve education
levels especially female education or policies which fetch farmers better prices
for their products (through, for instance, eliminating middlemen) are more
likely to reduce povery and the incidence of child labor. Poverty reduction
along with institutional reforms that remove adult labor market imperfec-
tions will go a long way towards reducing the incidence of child labor.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper examined the impact of wealth on child labor using a unique
data set that provides information on individual hours worked as opposed
to a dummy that indicates whether a child works or not. This has two
major advantages. First, the detailed activity information allowed us to in-
clude domestic work done by children in their own homes as child labor,
which we ﬁnd to be the largest component. Second, since our measure of
child labor is not a censored or binary variable we can estimate the eﬀects
of various factors on child labor through regression analysis, which only re-
quires the error term of the regression equation to be uncorrelated with the
15regressors. In contrast, censored or binary data require maximum liklihood
or semiparametric/nonparametric approaches that necessitate much stronger
assumptions such as knowledge of the form of the error distribution or the
assumption of independent and identical distribution of the error term con-
ditional on the regressors. Hence, the availability of detailed data has helped
us in using simple and robust estimation approaches than those used in most
earlier studies.
It was found that, with respect to the two important rural assets , land
and livestock, child labor increases with asset levels way past the average val-
ues of the assets. With respect to land we ﬁnd that child labor declines well
before the observed maximum land holding. This suggests that labor market
imperfections may be signiﬁcant enough to hinder the expected monoton-
ically declining relationship of wealth and child labor. In addition, it was
found that adult female education is twice as eﬀective in reducing child labor
as compared to adult male education. All this is not to deny that there are
contexts where simple legal retrictions may be the right invention. But in
reality the inventions themselves may be products of the wider political and
economic environment ( Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005). Moreover, as this paper
tried to show, there are unexpected intricacies in the way certain variables
impact on child labor and we need to understand these, theoretically and em-
pirically, before we can design eﬀective policies. Overall, policies fostering the
smooth functioning of adult labor markets coupled with non-agrarian ways
of increasing wealth are likely to be eﬀective tools for reducing child labor.
Our future research plans include using structural estimation to evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of various policies for reducing child labour.
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